Syntactic cut-elimination for a fragment of the modal mu-calculus  by Brünnler, Kai & Studer, Thomas
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 1838–1853Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
www.elsevier.com/locate/apal
Syntactic cut-elimination for a fragment of the modal mu-calculus
Kai Brünnler, Thomas Studer ∗
Institut für Informatik und angewandte Mathematik, Universität Bern, Neubrückstrasse 10, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 23 June 2011
Received in revised form 25 March 2012
Accepted 29 April 2012
Available online 14 May 2012
Communicated by S.R. Buss
MSC:
03B45
03F05
Keywords:
Cut-elimination
Inﬁnitary sequent system
Nested sequents
Mu-calculus
For some modal ﬁxed point logics, there are deductive systems that enjoy syntactic cut-
elimination. An early example is the system in Pliuskevicius (1991) [15] for LTL. More
recent examples are the systems by the authors of this paper for the logic of common
knowledge (Brünnler and Studer, 2009) [5] and by Hill and Poggiolesi (2010) for PDL [8],
which are based on a form of deep inference. These logics can be seen as fragments of
the modal mu-calculus. Here we are interested in how far this approach can be pushed in
general. To this end, we introduce a nested sequent system with syntactic cut-elimination
which is incomplete for the modal mu-calculus, but complete with respect to a restricted
language that allows only ﬁxed points of a certain form. This restricted language includes
the logic of common knowledge and PDL. There is also a traditional sequent system for the
modal mu-calculus by Jäger et al. (2008) [9], without a syntactic cut-elimination procedure.
We embed that system into ours and vice versa, thus establishing cut-elimination also for
the shallow system, when only the restricted language is considered.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Modal ﬁxed point logics occur in many different forms. For instance, we have temporal logics with an always operator,
epistemic logics with a common knowledge operator, program logics with an iteration operator, and the propositional modal
μ-calculus with ﬁxed points for arbitrary positive formulas.
While the model-theoretic side of modal ﬁxed point logics is very well investigated [3,23], not much is known about
their proof-theoretic aspects. However, it is possible to obtain syntactic cut-elimination results for logics of this kind through
inﬁnitary calculi that allow for deep applications of inference rules.
A deductive system is called inﬁnitary if it includes inference rules with inﬁnitely many premises. In a temporal logic,
for instance, we may consider a rule like
A next A next next A · · ·
always A
that has for any natural number i a premise consisting of an i-fold nesting of next operators applied to A.
We say that an inference rule applies deeply if it does not only apply to an outermost connective but also, in a certain
sense, deeply inside formulas. Again for temporal logic, we may consider a conjunction rule that applies inside an arbitrary
nesting of next operators. An instance of a rule of this kind is
next next A next next B
next next (A ∧ B)
.
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Note that the case of linear time logic is particularly simple since it is enough to consider nestings of next operators only.
The case of syntactic cut-elimination for modal ﬁxed point logics over arbitrary Kripke structures turned out to require more
machinery. This case requires systems with some form of deep inference such as nested sequents [4,10] also called tree-
hypersequents [16]. Brünnler and Studer [5,6] use them to present a calculus with syntactic cut-elimination for the logic
of common knowledge. Hill and Poggiolesi [8] use deep inference to establish a cut-elimination result for propositional
dynamic logic.
Each of the cut-elimination results mentioned above applies only to one particular logic. In the present paper we try
to identify the common core of those results and establish a general cut-elimination theorem that subsumes the previous
ones. To do so, we base our results on a fairly small fragment of the modal μ-calculus that is however large enough to
embed common knowledge operators as well as iteration operators from PDL. We then show that we necessarily have to
restrict ourselves to a fragment: our system is incomplete for larger fragments. In particular, we cannot treat the whole
propositional modal μ-calculus, not even the one-variable fragment.
Another question is the relationship of traditional shallow systems for modal ﬁxed point logics and their deep counter-
parts. Brünnler and Studer [5] examine this relationship for the logic of common knowledge. They present embeddings of a
shallow system into a deep system and vice versa. Again, so far this relationship has not been studied from a general per-
spective. Now we present embeddings of a shallow system for our fragment into the deep system and vice versa. Note that
the direction from shallow into deep is straightforward in the case of common knowledge but requires much more work in
our general setting. Moreover, the direction from deep into shallow as presented in [5] contains a mistake (Lemma 12 does
not hold) that is ﬁxed in the present paper.
Kozen [11] introduced the propositional modal μ-calculus together with a Hilbert-style deductive system, for which
Walukiewicz [24] was able to establish completeness. This system includes an induction rule to guarantee that a formula of
the form μX .A denotes a least ﬁxed point. This implies that also some variant of a cut rule has to be present in the system
in order to make use of the power of the induction rule. Hence cut-elimination is not possible for that system.
The situation is different if we replace the induction rule by an inﬁnitary rule that introduces greatest ﬁxed points.
Such a rule has been proposed by Kozen [12] based on the ﬁnite model property of the μ-calculus. Jäger et al. [9] later
showed by semantic means that the cut rule is admissible in the inﬁnitary system. In the present paper, we study syntactic
cut-elimination for that system. However, we can only deal with a fragment where least ﬁxed point variables do not occur
in the scope of  operators (and dually greatest ﬁxed point variables not in the scope of ). Fontaine [7] showed that this
syntactic restriction of least ﬁxed point formulas characterizes the continuous fragment of the μ-calculus.
There are also syntactic cut-elimination results for the ﬁxed point logics μMALL= by Baelde and Miller [1] and Linc− by
Tiu and Momigliano [21]. Since these systems are based on induction rules (and thus are ﬁnitary), cut-elimination results in
the loss of the subformula property. Still the cut-free proofs do have some useful structure. In a different line of research,
Mints and Studer [13] were recently able to provide a syntactic transformation of Hilbert-style proofs from Kozen’s original
system to cut-free proofs in the inﬁnitary system.
Our paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst recall the inﬁnitary shallow system Gμ for the propositional modal μ-calculus
introduced by Jäger et al. in [9] and show the obstacles to cut-elimination. In Section 3 we introduce our deep system Dμ
for modal ﬁxed point logic and establish syntactic cut-elimination for that system. We observe that Dμ is not complete for
the modal μ-calculus. Thus we deﬁne a fragment of the μ-calculus in which we can embed PDL and the logic of common
knowledge, and for which Dμ is complete. This is established in Section 4 by embedding System Gμ restricted to our
fragment into System Dμ . We also present the reverse embedding of Dμ into Gμ .
Combining the embedding of Gμ into Dμ , cut-elimination of Dμ , and the embedding of Dμ into Gμ provides syntactic
cut-elimination for Gμ with respect to our fragment.
2. The shallow system
Formulas. We start with a countable set P of atomic propositions and one variable X . An operator form is given by the
following grammar
O ::= X | p | p¯ | |⊥ | (O ∧ O ) | (O ∨ O ) |O |O |μX .O |νX .O
where p ∈ P . In case there is no danger of confusion, we will omit parentheses. A formula is an operator form in which
every occurrence of X is in the scope of a μ- or a ν-operator. That is a formula does not contain free occurrences of the
variable X . Note that in other work on the μ-calculus formulas are sometimes deﬁned such that they may also contain free
variables.
As usual, we deﬁne the negation A¯ of operator forms and formulas A inductively as follows:
1. ¯¯p := p, ¯ := ⊥, ⊥¯ := , and X¯ := X ,
2. A ∧ B := A¯ ∨ B¯ and A ∨ B := A¯ ∧ B¯ ,
3. A := A¯ and A := A¯,
4. μX .A := νX . A¯ and νX .A := μX . A¯.
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If B is an operator form and A a formula, then B(A) denotes the formula which is given by substituting each free
occurrence of X in B with A. This allows us to syntactically deﬁne ﬁnite approximations of ﬁxed points. We set for n 0:
ν0X .B :=  νn+1X .B := B(νn X .B),
μ0X .B := ⊥ μn+1X .B := B(μn X .B).
We consider a language with only one variable since this simpliﬁes the presentation and the proofs (see, for instance,
Lemma 27). We remark that Theorem 6 holds for an arbitrary number of variables and we believe that our approach can be
extended to the general case. Note, however, that the variable hierarchy of the μ-calculus is strict [2].
Later we have to restrict ourselves to a fragment that includes, for instance, PDL and the logic of common knowledge.
These logics can easily be embedded using one variable only, see Remark 21.
Deﬁnition 1 (Rank). We now deﬁne the rank rk(A) of an operator form A inductively by:
1. rk() := rk(⊥) := rk(p) := rk(p¯) := rk(X) := 1 for p ∈P .
2. rk(A ∧ B) := rk(A ∨ B) :=max(rk(A), rk(B)) + 1.
3. rk(A) := rk(A) := rk(A) + 1.
4. rk(μX .A) := rk(νX .A) := rk(A) + ω.
Lemma 2. Let A be a formula, let B be an operator form and let n < ω. We have:
1. rk(A) = rk( A¯).
2. rk(A) < ω2 .
3. If rk(B) rk(A) then rk(B(A)) < rk(A) + ω.
4. rk(νn X .A) < rk(νX .A).
Proof. The ﬁrst two statements are immediate. The third one follows from a straightforward induction on B . The fourth
statement we now prove by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. So, given n > 0 and A, we need to show that
rk
(
νn X .A
)= rk(A(νn−1X .A))< rk(A) + ω.
By 3. we have an m1 such that
rk
(
A
(
νn−1X .A
))
< rk
(
νn−1X .A
)+m1.
By induction hypothesis we have an m2 such that
rk
(
νn−1X .A
)
< rk(A) +m2.
So we have
rk
(
A
(
νn−1X .A
))
< rk(A) +m1 +m2 < rk(A) + ω. 
A sequent is a ﬁnite multiset of formulas. We employ Γ,, . . . to denote sequents. If  is a sequent, then  is obtained
from  by preﬁxing the connective  to each formula occurrence in .
Inference rules. In an instance of the inference rule ρ
Γ1 Γ2 . . .
ρ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

the sequents Γ1,Γ2, . . . are its premises and the sequent  is its conclusion. An axiom is a rule without premises. We will
not distinguish between an axiom and its conclusion. A system, denoted by S , is a set of rules. The system Gμ is deﬁned in
Fig. 1. Notice that the ν-rule has inﬁnitely many premises.
The cut rule, weakening, and contraction are shown in Fig. 2. In an instance of cut, the formula A is called the cut
formula.
Derivations and proofs. In the following, a tree is a tree in the graph-theoretic sense, and may be inﬁnite. A tree is well-
founded if it does not have an inﬁnite path. A derivation in a system S is a directed, rooted, ordered and well-founded
tree whose nodes are labeled with sequents and which is built according to the inference rules from S . Derivations are
visualized as upward-growing trees, so the root is at the bottom. The sequent at the root is the conclusion and the sequents
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Γ, p, p¯
 −−−−−−
Γ,
Γ, A, B
∨ −−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A ∨ B
Γ, A Γ, B
∧ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A ∧ B
Γ, A
 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−Γ,A,
Γ, A(μX .A)
μ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,μX .A
Γ,νk X .B for all k 0
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,νX .B
Fig. 1. The shallow system Gμ .
Γ, A Γ, A¯
cut −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ
Γ
wk −−−−−−
Γ, A
Γ, A, A
ctr −−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A
Fig. 2. Admissible rules.
at the leaves are the premises of the derivation. A proof of a sequent Γ in a system is a derivation in this system with
conclusion Γ where all leaves are axioms. We write S 	 Γ if there is a proof of Γ in system S . Notice that derivations here
are in general inﬁnitely branching, thus their depth can be inﬁnite even though each branch has to be ﬁnite.
The derivability relation. The cut-rank of an instance of cut as shown in Fig. 2 is the rank of its cut formula A. The μ-rank
of an instance of the μ-rule as shown in Fig. 1 is the rank of the formula A(μX .A). The cut-rank of a derivation is the
supremum of the cut-ranks of its instances of cut, and similarly for the μ-rank. For a system S and ordinals α, β , γ and
a sequent Γ we write S α
β,γ Γ to say that there is a proof of Γ in system S + cut with depth bounded by α, cut-rank
strictly smaller than β , and μ-rank strictly smaller than γ . We write S α
β
Γ if there exists a γ such that S α
β,γ Γ and
we write S
β
Γ if there exists an α such that S α
β
Γ . Thus, S 0 Γ means that Γ can be derived in S alone—which is
cut-free.
Admissibility and invertibility. An inference rule ρ is depth- and cut-rank-preserving admissible or, for short, perfectly ad-
missible for a system S if for each instance of ρ with premises Γ1,Γ2, . . . and conclusion , whenever S
α
β
Γi for each
premise Γi , then S
α
β
. For each rule ρ , there is its inverse ρ , which has the conclusion of ρ as its only premise and
admits each premise of ρ as its conclusion, i.e. both
∧ Γ, A ∧ B
Γ, A
and ∧ Γ, A
∧ B
Γ, B
are instances of the inverse of ∧ and if ρ is a rule without premises, then it does not have an inverse. An inference rule ρ
is perfectly invertible for a system S if ρ is perfectly admissible for S.
We omit the proof of the following lemma, which is standard [19,22].
Lemma 3.
1. The rules weakening and contraction are perfectly admissible for Gμ .
2. All rules of Gμ except  are perfectly invertible for Gμ .
Deﬁnition 4 (Kripke structure). A Kripke structure K = (S, R,π) is a triple where S is a non-empty set of states, R ⊆ S × S
is the accessibility relation, and π :P ∪ {X} → Pow(S) is the valuation function. Furthermore, given a set T ⊆ S , we deﬁne
the Kripke structure K[X := T ] as the triple (S, R,π ′), where π ′(X) = T , and π ′(p) = π(p) for all p ∈P .
Assume we are given a Kripke structure K = (S, R,π) and a formula A. We deﬁne the set of states ‖A‖K of S at which
A holds by induction on the structure of A.
Deﬁnition 5 (Denotation). Let K = (S, R,π) be a Kripke structure. For every operator form and every formula A we deﬁne
the set ‖A‖K ⊆ S inductively as follows:
‖p‖K := π(p) for all p ∈ P ∪ {X},
‖p¯‖K := S \ π(p) for all p ∈ P,
‖‖K := S and ‖⊥‖K :=∅,
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‖B‖K := {w ∈ S: v ∈ ‖B‖K for all v such that wRv},
‖B‖K := {w ∈ S: v ∈ ‖B‖K for some v such that wRv}.
For all formulas μX .A and νX .A we deﬁne
‖μX .A‖K :=
⋂{
T ⊆ S: T ⊇ F A,K(T )
}
and
‖νX .A‖K :=
⋃{
T ⊆ S: T ⊆ F A,K(T )
}
where F A,K is the operator on Pow(S) given by F A,K(T ) := ‖A‖K[X:=T] for every subset T of S .
A formula A is called valid if for every Kripke structure K = (S, R,π) we have ‖A‖K = S .
Making use of a canonical model construction, Jäger et al. [9] showed that System Gμ (which is cut-free) is sound and
complete.
Theorem 6. For all formulas A we have
Gμ 0 A if and only if A is valid.
2.1. The problems for cut-elimination
Although System Gμ is complete even without cut, the usual cut-elimination procedure does not work for Gμ . The
problem is that the premises of the μ- and ν-rules do not correspond to each other. Consider the following proof:
Γ, A(μX .A)
μ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,μX .A
· · · Γ,νk X . A¯ · · ·
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,νX . A¯
cut −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ
Here the typical transformation would push the cut above the μ- and ν-rules. However, this is not possible since A(μX .A)
is not the negation of any νk X . A¯.
A ﬁrst approach to solve this problem is to consider a system G′μ which is deﬁned like Gμ except that the μ-rule is
replaced with inﬁnitely many rules (one for each natural number k)
Γ,μX .A,μk X .A
μk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,μX .A
.
However, in System G′μ we cannot even derive the co-closure axiom
νX .X →νX .X, (1)
which states that νX .X is a post-ﬁxed point of the operator given by λX .X . If we search for a proof of this formula,
then we end up with the following derivation:
μk X .X, νl X .X for all l 0
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μk X .X, νX .X−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,μk X .X,νX .X
= −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,μk+1X .X,νX .X
μk+1 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,νX .X
∨ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X ∨νX .X
Of the ω-many assumptions of this derivation only one, namely l = k, is provable in G′μ . All the others cannot be proved.
The problem with deriving (1) in G′μ is that in a proof search procedure the rule μk has to be applied before ν can be
applied which means that we have to choose the iteration number k too early.
This problem can be solved if we switch to nested sequents that allow the deep application of rules. Then we can ﬁrst
apply the ν-rule deeply inside the  modality and then in each premise apply μk choosing an appropriate iteration number
for that premise. This is presented in detail later in Example 11.
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Γ {p, p¯}  −−−−−−−−Γ {}
Γ {A, B}
∨ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A ∨ B}
Γ {A} Γ {B}
∧ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A ∧ B}
Γ {[A]}
 −−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A}
Γ {A, [A,]}
 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A, []}
Γ {μX .A,μk X .A}
μk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A}
Γ {νk X .B} for all k 0
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {νX .B}
Fig. 3. The deep system Dμ .
Γ {A} Γ { A¯}
cut −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {∅}

nec −−−−[]
Γ {∅}
wk −−−−−−−−
Γ {}
Γ {,}
ctr −−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {}
Fig. 4. Admissible rules.
3. The deep system
Deﬁnition 7. We deﬁne nested sequents and boxed sequents inductively as follows: 1) a nested sequent is a ﬁnite multiset
of formulas and boxed sequents, and 2) a boxed sequent is an expression of the form [Γ ] where Γ is a nested sequent.
The letters Γ,, . . . from now on denote nested sequents and the word sequent from now on refers to nested sequents,
except when it is clear from the context that a sequent is shallow, such as a sequent appearing in a derivation in Gμ .
A sequent is always of the form
A1, . . . , Am, [1], . . . , [n]. (2)
As usual, the comma denotes multiset union and there is no distinction between a singleton multiset and its element.
The corresponding formula of the sequent given in (2) is ⊥ if m = n = 0 and otherwise
A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Am ∨D1 ∨ · · · ∨Dn
where D1, . . . , Dn are the corresponding formulas of the sequents 1, . . . ,n . We denote the corresponding formula of the
sequent Γ by Γ F , but sometimes we do not distinguish between the two.
We introduce the additional symbol { }, called the hole, to deﬁne sequent contexts, or contexts, for short. They are denoted
by Γ { },{ },Σ{ }, and so on, and they follow the same notational conventions as sequents.
Deﬁnition 8 (Sequent context). Contexts are inductively deﬁned as follows.
1. The singleton multiset containing the hole is a context, it is called the empty context.
2. If Γ { } is a context and Σ is a sequent, then the multiset union of Γ { } and Σ is a context.
3. If Γ { } is a context, then the singleton multiset containing [Γ { }] is a context.
A context has exactly one occurrence of the symbol { }. We can substitute sequents for this symbol as follows.
Deﬁnition 9. Let Γ { } be a context and  be a sequent. The sequent Γ {} is given as follows.
1. If Γ { } is the empty context, then Γ {} is .
2. If Γ { } is the multiset union of a context Γ ′{ } and a sequent Σ , then Γ {} is the multiset union of Γ ′{} and Σ .
3. If Γ { } is the singleton multiset containing [Γ ′{ }], then Γ {} is the singleton multiset containing [Γ ′{}].
Deﬁnition 10 (Formula context). A formula context C{ } is a formula with exactly one occurrence of the special atom { } which
may only occur in the scope of ∨ and . If C{ } is a formula context and A is a formula, then the formula C{A} is obtained
by replacing { } in C{ } with A. The corresponding formula context Γ F { } of a given context Γ { } is deﬁned by analogy
with the notion of a corresponding formula.
The system Dμ is the set of axioms and inference rules in Fig. 3. The rules cut, necessitation, weakening, and contraction
are shown in Fig. 4.
Example 11. To see System Dμ at work we will show a derivation of the co-closure axiom (1) in Dμ . Looking at it from
a proof search perspective, we see that we can ﬁrst apply the ν-rule deeply behind the , and then apply μk+1 with a
different k in each branch.
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μX .X,μk X .X, [μk X .X, νk X .X]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,μk X .X, [νk X .X]
= −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,μk+1X .X, [νk X .X]
μk+1 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X, [νk X .X] · · ·
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X, [νX .X]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X,νX .X
∨ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
μX .X ∨νX .X
The following lemma can be shown in the same way as the corresponding lemma for the logic of common knowledge [5].
Lemma 12.
1. The rules necessitation, weakening, and contraction are perfectly admissible for Dμ .
2. All rules of Dμ are perfectly invertible for Dμ .
3.1. Cut-elimination
We will ﬁrst give some ordinal theoretic preliminaries. For a detailed account and formal deﬁnitions of the following
concepts we refer to Schütte [20]. As usual, α # β denotes the natural sum of α and β which, in contrast to the ordinary
ordinal sum, does not cancel additive components. The binary Veblen function ϕ is generated inductively as follows:
1. ϕ0β := ωβ ,
2. if α > 0, then ϕαβ denotes the βth common ﬁxed point of the functions λξ.ϕγ ξ for γ < α.
Lemma 13 (Reduction lemma). For each context Γ { } and each formula A with rk(A) = β , we have: if (1) Dμ α1β Γ {A} and
(2) Dμ
α2
β
Γ { A¯}, then Dμ α1#α2β Γ {∅}.
Proof. As usual, by induction on α1 #α2 and a case analysis on the two lowermost rules in the given proofs. We only show
one case, namely the active case for A = νX .B . We have
Dμ
α1,k
β
Γ
{
νk X .B
}
for all k 0 (3)
and
Dμ
α2,1
β
Γ
{
μX .B¯,μ j X .B¯
}
for some j. (4)
By weakening we also have
Dμ
α1
β
Γ
{
νX .B,μ j X .B¯
}
.
The induction hypothesis together with (4) yields Dμ
α1#α2,1
β
Γ {μ j X .B¯}. Applying a cut with rank rk(νk X .B) < rk(A) to this
sequent and (3) for k = j results in Dμ α1#α2β Γ {∅}.
All other cases are similar to the ones found in Brünnler and Studer [5]. 
From the reduction lemma we obtain the ﬁrst and the second elimination theorem as usual, see for instance Pohlers [17,
18] or Schütte [20].
Theorem 14 (First elimination theorem). If Dμ
α
β+1 Γ , then Dμ
2α
β
Γ .
Theorem 15 (Second elimination theorem). If Dμ
α
β+ωγ Γ , then Dμ
ϕγ α
β
Γ .
Since all our cut ranks are below ω2, we ﬁnally obtain the following cut-elimination result.
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α
β
Γ , then Dμ
ϕ2α
0 Γ .
3.2. The system is incomplete
We are going to show that System Dμ is not complete for (the standard semantics of) the modal μ-calculus. In order to
do so, we ﬁrst introduce an alternative notion of validity that is based on ﬁnite approximations instead of least and greatest
ﬁxed points.
Given an operator F and an n 0 we deﬁne Fn inductively as the identity operator for n = 0 and as F ◦ Fn−1 for n 1.
Deﬁnition 17. Let K = (S, R,π) be a Kripke structure. For every formula A we deﬁne the set AK ⊆ S inductively like ‖A‖K
except for the following two cases:
μX .AK :=
⋃
n<ω
GnA,K(∅) and νX .AK :=
⋂
n<ω
GnA,K(S)
where GA,K is the operator on S given by GA,K(T ) := AK[X:=T] for every subset T of S .
A formula A is called valid for ﬁnite approximations if for every Kripke structure K = (S, R,π) we have AK = S .
Soundness of Dμ with respect to ﬁnite approximations is shown as usual by induction on the depth of the derivation.
Lemma 18 (Dμ is sound for ﬁnite approximations). For all formulas A and all ordinals α,β we have that if Dμ
α
β
A, then A is valid
for ﬁnite approximations.
Lemma 19. The formula (μX .X) → μX .X is not valid for ﬁnite approximations.
Proof. Consider some Kripke structure K = (ω + 1 = {ω, . . . ,2,1,0},>,π). Note that GnX,K(∅) = {0, . . . ,n − 1}. Expanding
the deﬁnitions shows that ω ∈ (μX .X)K = ω + 1 but ω /∈ μX .XK = ω. 
Theorem 20. System Dμ is not complete for (the standard semantics of ) the modal μ-calculus.
Proof. (μX .X) → μX .X is a valid formula. However, by the two previous lemmas, we see that it is not derivable
in Dμ . 
3.3. The system is complete for a fragment
We now deﬁne a restricted language for which System Dμ is complete as we will show later in Theorem 32. The
restricted language disallows a diamond to occur between a ν and its bound variable and disallows a box to occur between
a μ and its bound variable. We simultaneously deﬁne μ-operator forms M , ν-operator forms N , and restricted formulas F by
the following grammar
M ::= X | F | (M ∧ M) | (M ∨ M) |M
N ::= X | F | (N ∧ N) | (N ∨ N) |N
F ::= p | p¯ | |⊥ | (F ∧ F ) | (F ∨ F ) |F |F |μX .M |νX .N
where p ∈ P . Our deﬁnition of μ-operator form corresponds to the set C F ({X}) that is given in [7, Deﬁnition 11] to
syntactically capture the continuous fragment of the μ-calculus
Note that negation is well-deﬁned for the restricted language since the negation of a μ-operator form is a ν-operator
form and vice versa.
Remark 21. We can embed in the restricted language the iteration modality from PDL and the common knowledge modality
from epistemic logic. Namely, for PDL we observe that [p∗]A corresponds to νX .(A ∧ [p]X) and for common knowledge we
observe that CA corresponds to νX .E(A ∧ X) where E is the everybody knows modality. Of course, to really embed those
logics we would have to switch to a multi-modal language and maybe also include new rules for the additional modalities.
However, those rules would not affect the essence of the cut-elimination procedure. Important for that are only the rules
for ﬁxed points and those are all covered by our approach.
Note that it is not possible to embed in our restricted language all the ﬁxed point modalities occurring in CTL. In
particular, until with universal path quantiﬁers does not ﬁt: ∀(AUB) corresponds to
μX .
(
B ∨ (A ∧X ∧))
which is not a restricted formula.
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Deﬁnition 22. System Gμr is obtained from system Gμ by adding the following proviso to the μ-rule as show in Fig. 1:
A is a μ-operator form.
Clearly, because of the subformula property, the provability of Gμ and Gμr (without cut) on restricted formulas is the
same.
Lemma 23. A restricted formula is provable in Gμr if and only if it is provable in Gμ .
4.1. Embedding shallow into deep
Lemma 24. Let Γ { } be a context and A, B be operator forms. We have that for all natural numbers k
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B
(
νk+1X .A
)} ⇒ Dμ αβ Γ
{
B
(
νk X .A
)}
.
Proof. The claim is established by an outer induction on k and an inner induction on α. The case for k = 0 is routine. For
k > 0 we distinguish the following cases.
1. If Γ {B(νk+1X .A)} is an axiom, then so is Γ {B(νk X .A)}.
2. If Γ {B(νk+1X .A)} is the conclusion of a rule ρ where the main connective is in Γ or in B , then we apply the inner
induction hypothesis to the premises of that rule and the claim follows by an application of ρ .
3. If B = X , then Γ {B(νk+1X .A)} = Γ {A(νk X .A)}. By the outer induction hypothesis we obtain Dμ αβ Γ {A(νk−1X .A)},
which is
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B
(
νk X .A
)}
. 
Deﬁnition 25 (len(A)). We deﬁne the length len(A) of an operator form A inductively as follows.
1. len() := len(⊥) := len(p) := len(p¯) := 0 for p ∈P .
2. len(μX .A) := len(νX .A) := 0.
3. len(X) := 1.
4. len(A ∧ B) := len(A ∨ B) := len(A) + len(B) + 1.
5. len(A) := len(A) := len(A) + 1.
Remark 26. In the next lemma, the restriction of A and B to ν-operator forms is essential. Clearly the sequent(νk X .X),μX .X is provable for every k. So without the restriction, the lemma would allow us to prove the sequent(νX .X),μX .X , and thus contradict the claim in the proof of Theorem 20.
Also note that while Γ { } is a context, Γ {B({})} is not a context meaning we cannot directly apply the introduction rule
for ν .
Lemma 27 (Deep ν-rule). Let Γ { } be a context and A, B be ν-operator forms. Assume we have Dμ αβ Γ {B(νk X .A)} for all natural
numbers k, then we have
Dμ
α+len(B)
β
Γ
{
B(νX .A)
}
.
Proof. By induction on the structure of B .
1. B = , B = ⊥, B ∈P , or B¯ ∈P . These cases are trivial.
2. B = X . The claim follows by an application of ν .
3. B = B1 ∧ B2. By invertibility of ∧ we obtain for all k
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B1
(
νk X .A
)}
and Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B2
(
νk X .A
)}
.
The induction hypothesis yields
Dμ
α+len(B1)
β
Γ
{
B1(νX .A)
}
and Dμ
α+len(B2)
β
Γ
{
B2(νX .A)
}
.
Thus an application of ∧ yields the claim.
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Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B1
(
νk X .A
)
, B2
(
νk X .A
)}
for all k.
Iterated applications of Lemma 24 yield
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
B1
(
νk1 X .A
)
, B2
(
νk2 X .A
)}
for all k1,k2.
We apply the induction hypothesis for each k2 to obtain
Dμ
α+len(B1)
β
Γ
{
B1(νX .A), B2
(
νk2 X .A
)}
for all k2.
Applying the induction hypothesis again yields
Dμ
α+len(B1)+len(B2)
β
Γ
{
B1(νX .A), B2(νX .A)
}
.
Finally, the claim follows by an application of ∨.
5. B =B1. By invertibility of  we obtain for all k
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{[
B1
(
νk X .A
)]}
.
The induction hypothesis yields
Dμ
α+len(B1)
β
Γ
{[
B1(νX .A)
]}
.
Thus an application of  yields the claim.
6. B = B1. Since B is a ν-operator form, this implies that B does not contain free occurrences of X . Therefore,
B(νk X .A) = B(νX .A). Thus the claim follows trivially.
7. B = μX .B1 or B = νX .B1. Trivial since B does not contain free occurrences of X . 
Lemma 28 (General identity axiom). Let Γ { } be a context and A be a formula. We ﬁnd that
Dμ
2·rk(A)
0 Γ {A, A¯}.
Proof. By induction on rk(A) and a case distinction on the main connective of A. In all cases the claim follows from a
simple derivation and the basic properties of the rank function. We just show the case where A = μX .B:
· · ·
I H
Γ {μX .B,μk X .B, νk X .B¯}
μ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .B, νk X .B¯} · · ·
ν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .B, νX .B¯} 
Lemma 29 (Restricted μ-unfolding). Let Γ { } be a context and A be a μ-operator form. We have that
Dμ
α
β
Γ
{
A(μX .A)
} ⇒ Dμ max(α+1,ω
2)
max(β,rk(A(μX .A))+1) Γ {μX .A}.
Proof. Consider the following derivation where gid is the general identity axiom and dν is the deep ν-rule:
Γ {A(μX .A)}
wk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A, A(μX .A)}
· · ·
gid −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A,μk+1X .A, νk+1X . A¯}
= −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A,μk+1X .A, A¯(νk X . A¯)}
μ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A, A¯(νk X . A¯)} · · ·
dν −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A, A¯(νX . A¯)}
cut −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A}
where dν is admissible by Lemma 27 and gid is admissible by Lemma 28. To obtain the bounds on the proof depth, we
observe that Lemma 28 yields Dμ
2·γ
0 Γ {μX .A,μk+1X .A, νk+1X . A¯} for some γ < rk(μX .A). The claim follows then from
2 · rk(μX .A) + len(A) + 2 < ω2. 
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Dμ
α
β
Γ, A ⇒ Dμ α+nβ Γ,A,.
Proof. Consider the following derivation:
Γ, A
nec −−−−−−−[Γ, A]
wk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−Γ, [Γ, A] −−−−−−−−−−−−−−Γ, [A],wk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−Γ,A, 
Theorem 31 (Embedding shallow into deep). Let Γ be a sequent. We have that
Gμr
α
β,γ Γ ⇒ Dμ
ω2·α
max(β,γ ) Γ.
Proof. By induction on α and a case analysis of the last rule in the proof. Each rule of Gμr , except for  and μ, is a special
case of its respective rule in Dμ . The case of  follows from Lemma 30. If for a μ-operator form A the sequent Γ ′,μX .A
has been derived by an application of μ, then we have α  1, rk(A(μX .A)) < γ , and
Gμ
α′
β,γ Γ
′, A(μX .A) for some α′ < α.
By the induction hypothesis we ﬁnd
Dμ
ω2·α′
max(β,γ ) Γ
′, A(μX .A).
Lemma 29 yields
Dμ
max(ω2·α′+1,ω2)
max(β,γ ) Γ
′,μX .A.
The claim follows by max(ω2 · α′ + 1,ω2)max(ω2 · α,ω2) = ω2 · α. 
Theorem 32. System Dμ is complete for restricted formulas.
Proof. By Lemma 23, we know that, with respect to restricted formulas, completeness of Gμ (Theorem 6) implies com-
pleteness of Gμr . The embedding of the previous theorem implies completeness of Dμ + cut and cut-elimination for Dμ
(Theorem 16) gives us completeness of Dμ with respect to restricted formulas. 
4.2. Embedding deep into shallow
We ﬁrst deﬁne a notion of saturation. Roughly, a sequent Γ is called locally saturated if whenever Γ is the conclusion of
a certain rule, then there is a premise whose sequent is a subsequent of Γ . The rules we consider here exclude the -rule
(which in some sense changes to another world) so we call them local.
Deﬁnition 33 (Locally saturated). A shallow sequent Γ is locally saturated if the following are true:
A ∨ B ∈ Γ ⇒ A, B ∈ Γ
A ∧ B ∈ Γ ⇒ A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ
μX .A ∈ Γ ⇒ A(μX .A) ∈ Γ
νX .A ∈ Γ ⇒ ∃kνk X .A ∈ Γ
Deﬁnition 34 (Canonical -instance). An instance of the rule
Γ, A−−−−−−−−−−−−−−Γ,A,
is canonical if  does not contain formulas of the form B .
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Proof. By induction on the depth of the given proof and a case analysis on the last rule. Most cases are trivial because of
local saturation. The only non-trivial case is the -rule. We distinguish two subcases. First, if A is the active formula, then
the second disjunct of our lemma is either immediate or obtained via admissibility of weakening if the rule instance is not
canonical. Second, if A is not the active formula, then the proof has the form
Γ2, B−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−A,Γ1,B
where A has been introduced inside . Thus we also get a proof of Γ1,B which shows the ﬁrst disjunct of our
lemma. 
The following deﬁnition introduces a notion of deep inference in the shallow system Gμ .
Deﬁnition 36. Let C{ } be a formula context (see Deﬁnition 10). Given a rule ρ we deﬁne a rule C{ρ} as follows: an instance
of the rule ρ is shown on the left iff an instance of the rule C{ρ} is shown on the right:
Γ, A1 · · · Γ, Ai · · ·
ρ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A
Γ,C{A1} · · · Γ,C{Ai} · · ·
C{ρ} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,C{A}
Given a rule ρ we deﬁne the rule ρˇ as follows: its set of instances is the union of all sets of instances of C{ρ} where C{ }
ranges over formula contexts.
Deﬁnition 37 (Admissible, ﬁnitely admissible). A rule ρ is admissible for System Gμ if for each instance of it with premises Γi
and conclusion  the following holds: if Gμ 0 Γi for all i, then Gμ 0 . The rule ρ is called ﬁnitely admissible if for each
instance there exists a natural number n such that Gμ
α
0 Γi for all i, then Gμ
α+n
0 .
Deﬁnition 38 (Guarded formula). A formula A is called guarded if the following holds: if σ X .B(X) is a subformula of A
where σ may be μ or ν , then every free occurrence of X in B(X) is in the scope of a modality.
It is well-known that for any formula there is a semantically equivalent one that is guarded [14]. Note also that the
formulas introduced in Remark 21 for embedding PDL and the logic of common knowledge are guarded.
Lemma 39 (Deep applicability preserves admissibility). Let C{ } be a formula context.
(i) There is an n such that for all Γ we have Gμ
n
0 Γ,C{}.
(ii) There is an n such that for all Γ we have Gμ
n
0 Γ,C{p ∨ p¯}.
(iii) If a rule ρ is admissible for Gμ , then C{ρ} is also admissible for Gμ . If we consider guarded formulas only, then we have: if a rule
ρ is ﬁnitely admissible for Gμ , then C{ρ} is also ﬁnitely admissible for Gμ .
Proof. The three statements are shown by induction on the structure of C{ }. Let us only show the case where C{ } =C1{ }
in statement (iii). We have the following situation:
· · · Γ,C1{Ak} · · ·C1{ρ} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,C1{A}
In order to apply Lemma 35, we ﬁrst need to replace the shown instance of the rule C1{ρ} by several instances of it
which are applied in a context that is locally saturated. We apply invertibility of ∧,∨,μ, and ν such that for each k there is
a proof of the form
Γ1,C1{Ak} · · · Γm,C1{Ak}∧,∨,μ,ν ===========================================
Γ,C1{Ak} (5)
where each Γ j (for 1 j m) is locally saturated. Note that m only depends on Γ .
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for each k it yields a proof of some sequent Γ ′j ,C1{Ak}. Thus we can build either
Γ j
wk −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ j,C1{A} or
· · · Γ ′j ,C1{Ak} · · ·
C1{ρ} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ ′j ,C1{A}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ j,C1{A}
where in the second case C1{ρ} is admissible by the induction hypothesis. Repeat this argument for each j with 1 j m,
which for each j yields of proof of Γ j,C1{A} in Gμ . From those we can derive Γ,C1{A} by a derivation as in (5) where
each Ak is replaced by A. This shows that C1{ρ} is admissible.
To obtain the result about ﬁnite admissibility in the context of guarded formulas we observe that the derivation in (5)
has ﬁnite depth if guarded formulas are considered only. The reason for this is that the length of the process of locally
saturating Γ does not depend on the iteration number k in the case where a guarded νX .B is treated. 
Lemma 40. The following rules are ﬁnitely admissible for Gμ .
Γ, A ∨ B
gc −−−−−−−−−−
Γ, B ∨ A
Γ, (A ∨ B) ∨ C
ga −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A ∨ (B ∨ C)
Γ, A ∨ A
gctr −−−−−−−−−−
Γ, A
Γ,(A ∨ B)
g −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ,A,B
Proof. Finite admissibility of gc , ga , and gctr follows immediately by invertibility of ∨. The rule g can easily be shown to
be ﬁnitely admissible by induction on the given proof of the premise. 
For our translation from deep into shallow we translate nested sequents into formulas and thus ﬁx an arbitrary order
and association among elements of a sequent. The arbitrariness of this translation gets in the way, and we work around it
as follows. We write
A
ac −−
B
if the formula B can be derived from the formula A by the rules gˇc and gˇa . Note that since gˇc and gˇa are admissible for
Gμ , so is ac. It is even ﬁnitely admissible if guarded formulas are considered only.
Lemma 41. Let Γ be a sequent, A(X) be μ-operator form, and B(X) be any operator form. We have that
Gμ
α
0 Γ, B
(
μk X .A
) ⇒ Gμ 2·α+10 Γ, B(μX .A).
Proof. By induction on α and a case analysis on the last rule.
1. Γ, B(μk X .A) is an axiom. If Γ or Γ, B(X) is an axiom, then the claim trivially holds. Otherwise, we ﬁnd B = X and
A is an atomic proposition, a negation of one, or . Thus Γ, A(μX .A) is also an axiom and the claim follows by an
application of μ.
2. ∧-rule. We distinguish the cases for the position of the active conjunction.
(a) If the active operator is in Γ , then we have
Gμ
α′
0 Γ1, B
(
μk X .A
)
and Gμ
α′
0 Γ2, B
(
μk X .A
)
for α′ < α. By the induction hypothesis we obtain
Gμ
2·α′+1
0 Γ1, B(μX .A) and Gμ
2·α′+1
0 Γ2, B(μX .A).
An application of ∧ yields Gμ
2·α+1
0 Γ, B(μX .A).
(b) The case where the active operator is in B(X) is analogous to the previous case.
(c) B = X and Γ,μk X .A has been derived from
Gμ
α′
0 Γ, A1
(
μk−1X .A
)
and Gμ
α′
0 Γ, A2
(
μk−1X .A
)
for suitable A1, A2 and α′ < α. By the induction hypothesis we obtain
Gμ
2·α′+1
Γ, A1(μX .A) and Gμ
2·α′+1
Γ, A2(μX .A).0 0
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2·α′+2
0 Γ, A(μX .A). Then,
Gμ
2·α+1
0 Γ,μX .A
follows from an application of μ and 2 · α′ + 3 2 · α + 1.
3. ∨-rule. This case is similar to the case of ∧.
4. -rule. We distinguish:
(a) If B(μk X .A) has been introduced by the built-in weakening in , then the claim trivially holds.
(b) Otherwise, if B = X , then we have Gμ α
′
0 Γ
′, B ′(μk X .A) for some α′ < α. By the induction hypothesis we get
Gμ
2·α′+1
0 Γ
′, B ′(μX .A).
An application of  yields the claim.
(c) If B = X , similar to the previous case we have
Gμ
α′
0 Γ
′, A′
(
μk−1X .A
)
from which we get by the induction hypothesis and an application of 
Gμ
2·α′+2
0 Γ, A(μX .A)
for some α′ < α. Then, Gμ
2·α+1
0 Γ,μX .A follows from an application of μ and 2 · α′ + 3 2 · α + 1.
5. μ-rule. We distinguish the cases for the position of the active μ-operator.
(a) If the active operator is in Γ , then the claim follows easily from the induction hypothesis and an application of μ.
(b) If the active operator is in B , then X is not free in B and the claim trivially holds.
(c) If B = X and A(μk−1X .A) is the active formula, then A must be of the form μX .C . Thus X is not free in A and we
have A(μk−1X .A) = A(μX .A). The claim follows immediately from an application of μ.
6. ν-rule. We distinguish the cases for the position of the active ν-operator.
(a) If the active operator is in Γ , then for all i < ω there are αi < α with
Gμ
αi
0 Γi, B
(
μk X .A
)
.
By the induction hypothesis we obtain for all i < ω
Gμ
2·αi+1
0 Γi, B(μX .A).
An application on ν yields Gμ
2·α+1
0 Γ, B(μX .A).
(b) If the active operator is in B , then X is not free in B and the claim trivially holds.
(c) If B = X and A(μk−1X .A) is the active formula, then A must be of the form νX .C . Thus X is not free in A and we
have A(μk−1X .A) = A(μX .A). The claim follows immediately from an application of μ. 
Theorem 42. Assume Dμ
α
0 Γ . We then have Gμ 0 Γ F . If we consider guarded formulas only, then we have Gμ
ω·(α+1)
0 Γ F .
Proof. By induction on α and a case analysis on the last rule.
1. If the endsequent of the given proof is axiomatic, say it is of the form Γ {p, p¯}, then for some n we have Gμ n0 Γ F {p∨ p¯}
by Lemma 39. Admissibility of ac gives Gμ 0 Γ {p, p¯}F . If we consider guarded formulas only, ac is ﬁnitely admissible
which gives Gμ
n
0 Γ {p, p¯}F for some n. The case where the endsequent is of the form Γ {} is similar.
2. If the last rule is an instance of ∨, then an application of ac proves our claim.
3. The case of the -rule is trivial since the corresponding formula for the premise is the corresponding formula of the
conclusion.
4. For the ν-rule, we apply the following transformation:
· · · Γ {νk X .A} · · ·
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {νX .A} 
· · ·
Γ {νk X .A}
F
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {νk X .A} · · ·
Γ F {ν} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {νX .A}
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {νX .A}
F
To obtain the claim about the case of guarded formulas, let the depth of the proof on the left be α and the depth of
the premises be αk . The depths of the ac derivations are the same in all branches since they do not depend on the
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is a ﬁnite ordinal n such that the proof on the right has the depth
sup
(
ω · (αk + 1) +m+ 1
)+ n+m
 sup
(
ω · (αk + 1)
)+ ωω · sup(αk + 1) + ωω · α + ω = ω · (α + 1),
remember that αk is the depth of the derivation of Γ {νk X .A}.
5. The case for the ∧-rule is similar.
6. For the -rule, we apply the following transformation:
Γ {A, [A,]}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A, []} 
Γ {A, [A,]}
F
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {A ∨(A ∨ F )}
Γ F {A∨g} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {A ∨ (A ∨F )}
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {(A ∨A) ∨F }
Γ F {gctr∨F } −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {A ∨F }
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {A, []}
F
Note that here a rule like C{ρ ∨ A} means rule ρ applied in the context C{{ } ∨ A}.
7. For the μk-rule, we apply the following transformation, where Γ ′{ } is such that Γ ′{μk X .A} = Γ {μX .A,μk X .A}:
Γ {μX .A,μk X .A}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A} 
Γ {μX .A,μk X .A}
F
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ ′ F {μk X .A}
L. 41 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ ′ F {μX .A}
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {μX .A,μX .A}
Γ F {ctr} −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ F {μX .A}
ac −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Γ {μX .A}
F
To obtain the claim about guarded formulas, we let the depth of the proof on the left be α and the depth of the premise
be α′ . Then there are ﬁnite ordinals m,n such that the proof on the right has the depth
2 · (ω · (α′ + 1)+m)+ 1+ n
= 2 · (ω · (α′ + 1))+ 2m+ 1+ n = (2 · ω) · (α′ + 1)+ 2m+ 1+ n = ω · (α′ + 1)+ 2m+ 1+ n
ω · (α′ + 1)+ ωω · (α + 1).
Remember that ordinal multiplication is associative and that 2 · ω = ω, see, for instance, [17]. 
Combining the results about embedding the shallow system into the deep system (with cut), cut-elimination for the
deep system, and embedding the deep system into the shallow system (without cut), we obtain the following corollary
about syntactic cut-elimination for the shallow system. Note that by Lemma 2, we know that the rank of any formula is
smaller than ω2. Hence if Gμ
α
β,γ Γ , then there is a natural number n such that β,γ ω · n.
Corollary 43. Let Γ be a sequent of restricted formulas. Assume we have Gμ
α
ω·n,ω·n Γ . Then we have Gμ 0 Γ . If we consider
guarded formulas only, then we have Gμ
ω·(ϕn1 (ω2·α)+1)
0 Γ .
5. Conclusion
We looked at syntactic cut-elimination for modal ﬁxed point logics from the general perspective of the modal μ-calculus.
We introduced a deep system Dμ for a fragment of the μ-calculus that includes the logic of common knowledge and PDL
(modulo a multi-modal language, see Remark 21). We then showed that Dμ enjoys syntactic cut-elimination. We also
showed that Dμ is not complete for the modal μ-calculus, which provides some evidence that our method cannot be
extended in a straightforward way to larger fragments of the modal μ-calculus. Via embedding a traditional shallow system
into Dμ and vice versa, we obtain cut-elimination for a given traditional shallow system. Thus our results subsume and
extend previous cut-elimination results for particular logics like PDL and the logic of common knowledge.
The main technical contribution of this paper are the embeddings of shallow into deep and vice versa. For PDL no such
embeddings were available so far and the embeddings for common knowledge are much simpler than those for the general
K. Brünnler, T. Studer / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 1838–1853 1853case. In particular, the embedding of shallow into deep is for free in the case of common knowledge since the operator
form for common knowledge corresponds almost directly to the structural connective [·] on the level of nested sequents.
If we restrict ourselves to guarded formulas, we also obtain upper bounds on the growth of the proof depth during
cut-elimination. So we get an upper bound on the depth of a cut-free proof given the depth of an original proof with cut.
Results of this kind were previously only known for common knowledge. Our bounds match those results but apply also to
other logics like PDL.
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